

Proposed Conclusions to NDE-43

1. The possibility of creating a strong Communist war-making complex <sup>(in the Far East)</sup> largely independent of the European power centers of the USSR must be a factor of great long-range strategic importance in any Kremlin plan for ultimate world domination.
2. Development of this complex would require Communist control of or access to the entire Far East, would be virtually impossible in time of war, and would probably take at least a decade in time of peace.
3. In the short run, the USSR and Communist China are probably most vitally concerned with maintaining the present Communist position in the <sup>(Far East)</sup> region, because of the real military advantages this position offers and because of the severe blow to Soviet prestige incumbent in the loss of any area now under Communist control.
4. Militarily, of the <sup>(Far Eastern)</sup> areas under non-Communist control Japan poses the greatest actual and potential threat to the vital military interests of the USSR and Communist China, and, conversely, a Japan under Communist control would pose the severest threat to the US position in the Far East.
5. In the present context of East-West relations and barring a general war, the Far East offers the Communists considerable opportunities for strengthening their global strategic position by draining Western resources and dividing and weakening the Western Powers in their efforts to resist Communist expansion.
6. An early general war, however, if the Communists did not control Japan, could well be strategically disadvantageous to the USSR in the Far East.
7. Even if the Communists were able to gain control of all the present non-Communist Far East in the early stages of a general war, the area would not be a significant addition to the over-all power position of the USSR.

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State Department Recommendations  
for Revisions in NIE-43

9. In the long run, even after control over all areas of the region had been secured, the USSR would encounter economic and political problems in developing a <sup>strong</sup> power complex in the Far East. Even in peacetime, the development of this complex would almost certainly require a decade or more; in wartime little progress towards that development could be made. If, however, such a complex could eventually be created, it would reduce the economic and military drain which the Soviet Far East and Communist China now imposes on western and central USSR. Moreover, it would add greatly to the Soviet potential for breaching US Pacific defenses and for launching attacks against the continental US.

10. Therefore, the USSR is probably more influenced by the fact that any partial expansion in this area would have immediate consequences within the present framework of East-West tension, by strengthening the Soviet global position relative to the West, endangering US Pacific defenses, draining Western resources, and impairing Western measures to strengthen Europe and the Middle East.

*in its assessment  
of the  
strategic  
importance  
of the FE.*

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